केस हारने पर वकील से मुआवज़े के लिए उपभोक्ता फ़ोरम में मुक़दमा दायर नहीं किया जा सकता, जानिए सुप्रीम कोर्ट का निर्णय

https://www.facebook.com/105312488559061/posts/127699026320407/

Who are hindus?

Who are HINDUS?

According to Section 2 of HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955

1) Those who are Hindus, Sikhs, Jainas or Buddhist by religion or birth

2) Those who is born of Hindu parents i.e. when both or one of the parents is a Hindu, Sikh, Jain or Bhuddist by religion

2) Those who are not Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews by religion, and who is not governed by any other law.

Domestic Violence Order passed u/s 19 of the Act

*Domestic Violence* - Order passed u/s 19 of the Act - Court to consider report of Protection Officer if same available on record - In same not available on record then Magistrate is not under any obligation to call for the same before passing any orders on an application u/s 19 of the Act. *(Allahabad)* - Available Full Text Free of Cost at allahabadhigcourt.in

*Contraband* - Total non compliance of S.42 of the Act - Impermissible - Accused acquitted. *(S.C)* - Available Full Text Free of Cost at https://main.sci.gov.in/

Bank Law Officers Can Also file vakalatnama

According to Bar Council Ethics Rules full time employees of law firms or company get affected. However, since designation of law officer of bank is AM(Legal) and not Full Time employee, hence, following the logic of law firms' Associates [who say that designation will decide if someone is full time employee or not - since their name is Associate, hence they are not full time employees],  therefore, an AM (Legal) of a Bank can also file vakalatnama on the lines of Associates/Sr. Associates of Law Firms.

Power to direct interim compensation under Section 143A in Negotiable Instrument Act 1881

Section 143A. Power to direct interim compensation.

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant--

(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and

(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.

(2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent. of the amount of the cheque.

(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque.

(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.

(5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

(6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.

Hindu daughters have equal rights to ancestral property.

My father died in 2011 after writing a Will in which he made a clear division of his self-acquired property. As per the Will, my brother and I will inherit the property, while my two sisters will get some cash. Now, one sister claims as per the 2005 amendment, the Will stands negated and wants an equal share. Is she right and can she go to court?

Two aspects are involved here. Firstly, the registered Will of your father, if duly executed, would be valid and his estate i.e., movable and immovable properties have to be administered as per the Will itself. Secondly, the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, gave equal rights to daughters in ancestral property and also in the coparcenary property of her parents. However, in your case, as the Will pertains only to self-acquired properties, the 2005 amendment would not be applicable since there is a Will in existence. Therefore, though the sister is within her legal rights to challenge the Will and approach the court, we believe that her claim would not have any merits.

Section 97 CrPC: An Alternative Remedy Prior To Habeas Corpus

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

The Writ of Habeas Corpus ensuring liberty of a citizens not just valid in a courtroom. It must be upheld outside as well. This discussion came to light in the Supreme Court on 20.05.2021 before the bench of Justices Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose, when the Court directed a husband to approach the authorities under Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC) and withdraw his Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) under Article 32.

The husband had filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus directly before the Supreme Court contending that his wife had been wrongfully detained by her family because they did not approve of their marriage. During the proceedings, the judge reminded the petitioner about Section 97 of the CrPC, which led to the subsequent withdrawal of the petition.

What is Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

S. 97 CrPC states that when a person is confined under certain circumstances, defined therein, the confinement is illegal. If the District Magistrate (Executive), SDM or Judicial Magistrate of First class "has reason to believe that such person is [illegally] confined", they can issue a search warrant to find that person.

The provision calls for "producing the body of the victim" before the authorities. In the case of Jay Engineering Works v. State (AIR 1968 Cal 407), the Court observed that a warrant under S. 97 CrPC is in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus for rescue of a wrongfully confined person by intervention of police, directed by a magisterial order.

When an application under S. 97 is filed, before issuing a search warrant the Magistrate (executive or judicial) must be satisfied that the person has been wrongfully confined. If the allegedly confined person then appears before the Magistrate and states that they are not wrongfully confined, the power under S. 97 cannot be used. It was in the case of Ammara Begum v. Habil Mea, (1962) 2 Cri LJ 159, that the Gujarat High Court directed that "when the person concerned states before the Magistrate that she was not wrongfully confined, but she was there of her own accord, the Magistrate cannot thereafter give any directions regarding the person's custody" (paragraph 8). However, the section does not case any obligation on the Magistrate to hold a detailed inquiry or to record such findings which are necessary after adjudication. And according to the judgement in PravinSingh v. Biharilal Singh (1989 Cri LJ 1386 (Bom)), neither does the affected party have the right to be heard before the Magistrate issues the search-warrantCircumstances which call for Invocation of Section 97 CrPC

In the case of Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P. (AIR 1964 SC 1625), the Supreme Court reprimanded the petitioner for filing a writ of Habeas Corpus for restitution of conjugal rights, and asked him to approach the authorities under Section 97 CrPC or file for a civil remedy. The Court noted that, "exigence of the writ at the instance of a husband is very rare in English Law, and in India the writ of habeas corpus is probably never used by a husband to regain his wife". Till 1964, therefore, Habeas Corpus under Article 32 or 226 had never been used in cases involving a plea for restitution of conjugal rights- especially not when the wife is illegally confined by her family. But in 2020-21, petitioners rush to Constitutional Courts with writ petitions for such orders, even when they have other effective, cheaper and less time-consuming remedies available.

A father can use S. 97 to gain back custody of her daughter from her in-laws who have illegally confined her (Biharilal Case). However, in Ramesh v. Laxmi Bai ((1998) 9 SCC 266), the Supreme Court ruled that S. 97 is not prima facie attracted to restore custody of child with the mother when the child was living with his own father. Furthermore, in case of a person wrongfully confined by a gherao, a warrant can be issued under this section for his rescue (Jay Engineering Works v. State).

Petitioners should, therefore, refrain from directly going to the Supreme Court with writ petitions and must first exhaust other remedies. Having a remedy under S. 97 which fast-tracks the process of ending wrongful confinement without the involvement of the Court is very important in a country where the citizens do not have equal access to legal-mechanisms. The police, the District Magistrates and the SDMs must take such requests filed by the complainants seriously so that they are not denied justice and do not feel the need to unnecessarily approach the Apex Court. Local authorities, having decentralised power, understand the local situation better than the Courts situated in State Capitals or Bhagwan Das Road in New Delhi. Further, by ensuring responsiveness to complaints, the authorities also ensure that Courts are used as the last resort after exhausting all the available remedies. It will save the precious time of the Courts and will lead to a better and just society where rights are enforced effectively- even outside the Courts. In conclusion, Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has enormous potential for use in habeas corpus pleas, and must not become a 'dead-letter law'